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I. Problem
It is a well-settled principle of international law that the appropriate
responses of a coastal state to an intrusion by a foreign submarine into its
internal waters or a non-innocent passage through its territorial sea are
limited to requiring the intruding ship to leave its waters and to making
a protest to the ship's flag state. This norm is related to the international
principle of jurisdictional immunity of foreign warships, a principle long
deemed vital to the public order of the oceans.
Increasing violations of Swedish internal waters by unauthorized for-
eign submarines, typified by the incident described in this Study, induced
Sweden to change its policy in ways not consonant with the existing in-
ternational position. Under this new policy, contained in a recently-en-
acted Swedish ordinance, an intruding submarine found submerged in
internal waters is to be forced to the surface, by armed force if necessary,
and brought to a Swedish port for investigation and further action. A
submerged submarine found in Swedish territorial waters is to be turned
back to the high seas, regardless of the purpose of its passage, by armed
force if necessary.
This policy received the express approval of several countries, and the
apparent tolerance of others. No protests, so far, have been voiced. The
Swedish actions, coupled with the apparent acquiescence of the interna-
tional community, mark the beginning of a potentially serious erosion of
the international norm proscribing use of force in dealing with intruding
submarines, without any explicit appraisal of the consequences of such
erosion by the international community.
II. Facts
The incident described in this Study consists of a sequence of two dis-
crete events, one at Karlskrona and the other at Harsfjarden.1
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1. The events at Karlskrona and HarsfJarden are only two chapters in a long history of
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A. The Karlskrona Event
On October 27, 1981, a Soviet diesel submarine ran aground in
Gasefjarden Bay, a restricted military area in the immediate vicinity of
the main Swedish naval base at Karlskrona.2 The vessel was spotted the
next day by a fishing boat, and ships from the Karlskrona base hurried to
the scene and surrounded the grounded vessel.3
The submarine's commander stated that the gyrocompass had failed,
causing a navigational error. The Swedish authorities, however, did not
believe this statement4 and immediately delivered a protest to the Soviet
Ambassador. 5 The Swedish public, fueled by the media, also made angry
protests against the event and its implications for Sweden's ability to pro-
tect its national security. 6 The Swedish Government announced that
Sweden would salvage the submarine, thereby rejecting the U.S.S.R.'s
demand that Soviet tugs be allowed to refloat the submarine,7 and stated
that return of the submarine to the Soviet Union would await the results
of an investigation to be undertaken by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Swedish Armed Forces.8 As preliminary steps towards return, Sweden
requested an apology from the Soviet Union, and at least tacit acceptance
of the investigation to be conducted by Swedish authorities. 9
On October 29, the Soviet Union agreed to the Swedish salvage opera-
intrusions into Swedish waters by foreign submarines. Between 1962 and 1980 Swedish waters
were violated by foreign submarines at least 93 times, with the highest number of trespasses in
a single year not exceeding nine. In 1981, the number of violations increased only slightly to
ten, but in the first eight months of 1982 the number of reported intrusions jumped to forty.
SUBMARINE DEFENSE COMM'N, COUNTERING THE SUBMARINE THREAT app. 2 (S.O.U. No.
13, 1983) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
2. Gasefjarden Bay is located in the Karlskrona Archipelago on the southeast coast of
Sweden. For the Swedish account of events and the statement of Swedish policy, see
Theutenberg, U 137 - Folkratt och neutralitetspolitik i tillampning, KUN GL. KRIGSVETEN-
SKAPSAKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIFT, No. 2, at 85, et seq. (1982) (on file with
the Yale Journal of International Law).
3. Svenska Dagbladet, Oct. 29, 1981; Frankfurter Allgemeine, Oct. 30, 1981.
4. Radio Stockholm Domestic Service [hereinafter cited as RSDS], Oct. 28, 1981; Foreign
Broadcast Information Service [hereinafter cited as FBIS] (W. Europe), Oct. 29, 1981, at 2
(interview with 0. Ullsten, Sw6dish Minister of Foreign Affairs); accord, Svenska Dagbladet,
Oct. 29, 1981.
5. RSDS, Oct. 28, 1981; FBIS, supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., Dagens Nyheter, Oct. 29, 1981 (editorial calling for interrogation of the Soviet
submarine's commander). I "
7. Radio Stockholm International Service [hereinafter cited as RSIS], Oct. 29, 1981 (Press
conference of the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs).
8. RSDS, Oct. 29, 1981; FBIS (W. Europe), Oct. 30, 1981, at 7 (text of the Government's
communiqu6).
9. Radio Stockholm to Europe and the Middle East, Oct. 31, 1981.
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tion,10 and on October 30 an apology was conveyed by the Soviet Ambas-
sador stating that the Soviet Union regretted that the submarine had
entered Swedish territorial waters and trespassed in a restricted military
area.I1 Although the Soviet government did not explain why the subma-
rine had gone so far into Swedish waters, the Swedish Minister of For-
eign Affairs described the apology as significant, particularly in light of
the Soviet Union's refusal to apologize for similar intrusions in the past,
and expressed the view that the apology demonstrated the Soviet Union's
willingness to cooperate.12
Despite this official optimism, however, the Soviet Union never acqui-
esced in a full-scale investigation, 13 although it finally did agree to allow
Sweden to conduct a limited inspection of the vessel and to interrogate
the Soviet submarine commander and crew on board a Swedish vessel in
the presence of representatives from the Soviet Embassy. 14 After reach-
ing this agreement on November 2, Swedish tugs pulled the Soviet sub-
marine from the mud to a safer anchorage within Swedish waters.15
The testimony of the commander and crew supported the initial Soviet
statement that the intrusion was caused by navigational error due to
compass failure. The Swedish Navy officer who examined the subma-
rine's log book reported, however, that crucial information had been al-
tered by the crew and that the navigational instruments were in good
order.' 6 The Swedish investigators were not allowed to inspect the for-
ward part of the submarine where torpedoes are usually carried. On
November 5, however, the Swedish authorities announced that experts
from the Research Institute of Swedish National Defense, who had ex-
amined the submarine externally, were able to establish the presence of
Uranium-238 on board, from which they concluded that torpedoes with
nuclear warheads were present on the Soviet submarine.17
The Swedish Government sent the Soviet authorities a "sharply
worded protest" demanding to know whether the submarine was carry-
ing nuclear arms.' The answer was utterly equivocal: the Soviet gov-
ernment stated that "the submarine carries, as do all naval vessels at sea,
the necessary weapons and ammunition."' 9
10. RSIS, Oct. 30, 1981; FBIS, supra note 8, at 8.
11. Radio Stockholm to Europe and the Middle East, Oct. 31, 1981.
12. Id.
13. RSIS, Oct. 30, 1981; FBIS, supra note 8, at 8.
14. RSDS, Nov. 2, 1981; FBIS (W. Europe), Nov. 2, 1981, at 3.
15. 1981 FAcTs ON FILE [hereinafter cited as 1981 FAcTs], 804 A2.
16. RSDS, Nov. 11, 1981.
17. RSDS, Nov. 5, 1981; FBIS (W. Europe), Nov. 6, 1981, at 2.
18. 1981 FAcTS, supra note 15, at 840 D, E3.
19. Id.
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At this point, Swedish authorities decided to close the investigation,
and the submarine was returned to the Soviets on November 6.20
B. The Harsjjarden Event
On October 1, 1982, nearly a year after the episode at Karlskrona,
Swedish naval units once again were put on a state of alert. A foreign
submarine had been spotted in Harsfjarden, near the top-secret Musko
naval base. A depth charge was dropped from a helicopter and the area
was searched by patrol boats and helicopters. The following day the
search continued and four further depth charges were dropped. The
Navy units placed metal barriers across the two main entrances to
Harsfjarden through which conventional submarines might leave the
area. The rest of the area (50 square kilometers) was not sealed off, and
minisubmarines could have escaped easily from the trap.21
On October 3, the search units made sonar contact with a submarine
and responded with two depth charges. The next day brought further
indications of submarine presence: radar and sonar echoes, air bubbles,
and a large oil slick that appeared on the surface after twelve depth
charges had been dropped.22 During the following two days similar evi-
dence of the presence of a submarine was noticed and twelve further
depth charges had been dropped.23
On October 6, minesweepers, a submarine rescue vessel, anticraft
units, and military police were brought into action in preparation for a
mine detonation. The following day the Navy dropped six depth charges
outside the northern barrier of Harsfjarden where there were indications
of either a breakout from within or an attempt to force through the bar-
rier from the outside. Thereafter, three mines were detonated in the vi-
cinity of Malsten. An internment center was prepared for any rescued
crew, and hospitals were alerted to prepare for possible injured seamen
who, it was assumed, would be suffering from detonation shock. Swedish
Armed Forces were on full alert along the entire coast and prepared for a
possible emergency surfacing of the foreign submarine.24
The mine detonations, however, produced no results; no evidence of
20. RSIS, Nov. 6, 1981; FBIS, supra note 17, at 5. The bill for the salvage operation
totaled 1.6 million kroner and was paid by the Soviet Government. Dagens Nyheter, Dec. 23,
1981; RSDS, Mar. 25, 1982.
21. Agence France Press (Stockholm) [hereinafter cited at AFP], Oct. 3, 1982; FBIS (W.
Europe), Oct. 4, 1982, at 4. The first press communiqu6 was issued by the Defense Staff on the
evening of October 2, 1982. Id.
22. AFP, Oct. 6, 1982.
23. Id.
24. AFP, Oct. 8, 1982.
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wreckage was found by divers or underwater cameras. In the evening,
new sonar contacts were obtained outside the northern barrier and in
north Mysingen, indicating that a submarine might have escaped from
the trap in Harsfjarden. Nevertheless, the search continued both inside
and outside the barrier, and on October 9 new controlled mines -were
laid. The same day, indications of possible submarine presence came
from Mamdo (north of Harsfjarden), and two days later from Danziger
Gatt (south of Harsfjarden). The latter were particularly strong on Octo-
ber 14, when two depth charges were dropped in Danziger Gatt. The
search continued until November 1, during which period there was no
further sonar contact. 25
III. Conflicting Claims
A. The Karlskrona Event
The physical presence of the grounded submarine in Swedish national
waters was the only material fact regarding Karlskrona as to which the
claimants were in agreement. Each had a different version of the purpose
of the submarine's mission, the causes of the accident, and the presence
of nuclear weapons on board the submarine.
The Soviets claimed that the submarine, "while making a routine
training cruise in the Baltic Sea, went off course in conditions of poor
visibility and ran aground."' 26 The Swedish Government, however,
maintained from the outset that the submarine was not performing a
mere training task, but rather was engaged in illegal intelligence-gather-
ing. The Swedish Commander-in-Chief, in his report of the Swedish in-
vestigation, contended that the Soviet submarine was already in Swedish
waters on October 24, 1981, and had carried out exercises for four days
inside and outside the territorial sea before it ran aground.27 He also con-
cluded that the submarine was on the surface in Swedish waters at least
two hours before it was grounded, and that its crew were aware that they
were entering a restricted military area.28
The Soviet Government described the charge of illegal activities as
"bewildering" and "a distortion of facts."'29 "What sober minded per-
25. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 105.
26. TASS, Nov. 4, 1981, reprinted in 33 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PREss, No. 44, at 7
(1981).
27. Svenska Dagbladet, Dec. 19, 1981. The report containing the Commander-in-Chief's
final conclusions was classified as secret and only part of it was published in December 1981.
28. Id.
29. 33 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PREss, No. 45, at 5 (1981) (statement of the Soviet govern-
ment issued Nov. 11, 1981).
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son," asked the Soviet Government, "to say nothing of military special-
ists, can suppose that a submarine, in a surface run with its running
lights on and operating diesel engines whose noise could be heard for a
great distance, at night and in conditions of poor visibility, could engage
in such 'activities'?" 30
It is a puzzling question indeed, and the Swedish Commander-in-Chief
had to admit that there were no definite indications of the submarine's
presence from radar or radio surveillance. The Report offered as a possi-
ble explanation the hypothesis that a radar echo was misinterpreted by
the Swedish coast guard. "Therefore, the possibility cannot be excluded
that radar surveillance did reveal the submarine, but that this was taken
at the time for a merchant ship or a fishing boat. Identification of radar
echoes must normally be effected through direct sighting. ' 31 In other
words, the Report indicates that it is conceivable that a foreign subma-
rine could perform illegal activities quite openly without being identified
by the Swedish coastal surveillance system.
As noted above,32 the parties also disagreed as to the cause of the in-
trusion. The Soviet authorities consistently maintained that the intrusion
was caused by failure of the vessel's navigational instruments,3 3 while the
Swedish government alleged that the submarine's navigational instru-
ments were in good working order.34 The Swedes did not believe the sub-
marine could have reached its location in the restricted military zone if
its navigational instruments had been inoperative, since this required
traversal of twelve nautical miles of Swedish territorial waters through
the outer Karlskrona archipelago and around dozens of small islands and
bays. 35 The Swedes also pointed to the fact that the submarine did not
send any distress signal for seventy-two hours after it had run aground.36
Finally, the Swedes asserted that there was a high probability that the
Soviet submarine was carrying nuclear warheads.37 The Soviets never di-
rectly denied this statement, although they did challenge the basis for the
30. Id.
31. Svenska Dagbladet, Dec. 19, 1982.
32. See supra notes 4, 5 & 16 and accompanying text.
33. TASS, Nov. 4, 1981; TASS, Nov. 11, 1981.
34. RSDS, Nov. 11, 1981.
35. Theutenberg, supra note 2, at 101-02.
36. Id. The Soviet Union's statements also did not offer any explanation for the grounding
itself, focusing instead on the reasons for the initial intrusion into Swedish waters. The Soviets
may have hoped by this tactic to focus attention on the wandering off course of the submarine,
thereby avoiding the embarrassing question of its trespass into the restricted military zone.
According to the Swedish Report, the grounding occurred because of an error in maneuvering
inside the restricted military area when the submarine attempted a rapid and powerful turn
that was executed too late. Svenska Dagbladet, Dec. 19, 1982.
37. RSDS, Nov. 5, 1981; FBIS, supra note 17, at 2.
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assertion, dismissing as "absurd" the claims of Swedish nuclear experts
that the presence of Uranium-238 made it likely that the submarine was
carrying nuclear weapons.38 With regard to the actual presence of nu-
clear weapons, the Soviet Union merely stated that the vessel carried
"necessary weapons and ammunition. ' 39
B. The Harsfjarden Event
The reconstruction of the dialogue between the Soviet and Swedish
governments during and after the Harsfjarden event is difficult. The com-
munication between the two governments resembled a long monologue
by Sweden, with only a short, indignant response on the part of the So-
viet Union. The Swedish government, embarrassed and under strong in-
ternal political pressure to clarify the circumstances of the event, put
forward an extensive analysis contained in the Report of the Submarine
Defense Commission ("Commission Report"). Because no direct evi-
dence of the presence of Soviet submarines was offered, the official Soviet
media simply dismissed all accusations as propaganda and falsifications
without entering into any factual or legal argument.
The Soviet Union's indignant response was prompted by Swedish alle-
gations that the submarines involved at Harsfjarden were Soviet subma-
rines. During the event itself, the Swedes had been careful to refrain
from making allegations regarding the nationality of the suspected sub-
marines, and this discretion no doubt helped repair Swedish-Soviet rela-
tions, damaged by the occurrences at Karlskrona.4°
The situation changed abruptly, however, with the publication of the
Commission Report in April 1983. The Commission concluded that the
submarines that had violated Swedish internal waters in September and
October 1982 belonged to the Soviet Union.41 In response, the Soviet
38. TASS, Nov. 11, 1981. TASS quoted Danish and United States scientists as saying
that, while Uranium-235 and Plutonium-238 are used for the production of nuclear weapons,
Uranium-238 "in principle" is not. Id.
39. 1981 FACTS, supra note 15, at 840 D, E3.
40. For example, on June 16, 1982, TASS reported that the Soviet and Swedish ministers
of foreign affairs had met in New York and "declared in favour of developing Soviet-Swedish
relations on the foundation of good-neighborliness and in the interest of the people of both
countries and the interests of enhancing peace, security and cooperation." TASS, June 16,
1982. Despite official restraint, however, the Swedish media and some representatives of the
military establishment speculated about the nationality of the perpetrators and quite openly
pointed to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union ignored these accusations for some time, but
eventually Soviet official sources responded by dismissing the "insinuations" as hostile propa-
ganda and "absurd fabrications" orchestrated by Swedish and U.S. militaristic circles in dero-
gation of Sweden's policy of neutrality. Krashnaya Zvezda, Aug. 5, 1982; Radio Moscow
(comment in Swedish), Aug. 17, 1982; TASS, Oct. 6, 1982; TASS, Oct. 11, 1982.
41. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 41.
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Union charged that the affair had been manipulated by the media to
cause a crisis in Swedish-Soviet relations which might serve to justify
military spending. 42 TASS charged that the Commission had failed to
offer direct proof of the nationality of the submarines, "rashly" conclud-
ing that the vessels were Soviet.43
Nevertheless, the Commission Report presented a detailed analysis of
the maneuvers allegedly carried out by the Soviet submarines at
Harsfjarden and of the likely motives for the intrusions, to which the
Soviets made no response. From an examination of the seabed, the Com-
mission Report concluded that both conventional submarines and
minisubmarines of both the "keel" and the "track" type had carried out
a series of exercises in the Harsfjarden area for a period of at least three
weeks.44
The Commission judged the primary reason for Sweden's failure to
locate the intruding submarines and force them to the surface to be that
the Swedes were unable to determine at the time of the HarsfJarden event
that they were dealing with minisubmarines, as well as conventional sub-
marines.45 The Commission Report found that the weapons and equip-
ment used, which were designed for use against conventional submarines
in open waters, as well as the Swedish command, communications, and
control systems, were inadequate. 46 The traditional hydroacoustic equip-
ment used could not cope with the special problems of anti-submarine
operations in an archipelago environment with a busy civilian traffic like
the Baltic Sea-an environment characterized by shallow water, a rocky
and uneven seabed, variations in salinity and temperature, and large
amounts of scrap metal on the seabed.47 The Report suggested, more-
over, that conducting the search in an area readily accessible to the me-
dia had also hindered the operation. 48
42. TASS, April 27, 1983, reprinted in 1983 FACTS ON FILE [hereinafter cited as 1983
FAcTs] 336 FG 3.
43. Id.
44. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 34-47. The Commission Report concluded that
there were six submarines altogether, at least three of which were minisubmarines. Id. The
submarines operated in pairs, with a conventional submarine serving as mother craft for each
minisubmarine. Id.
45. Id. at 42.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 45-46.
48. Id. at 43-44. The Commission Report stated:
The geographical location of the operations made it possible for the mass media to follow
developments in detail on the spot. This meant that the defense authorities were faced
with the time-demanding task of handling a fairly rich flora of rumors and often errone-
ous material information. In addition, they were required continuously to account for and
justify individual measures within the framework of the operation.
Id.
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As for the intruders' motives, the Commission Report suggested that
these were most probably to gather intelligence and to test new technol-
ogy and military strategy, including the use of sabotage troop units and
other special forces and preparations connected with the laying and
sweeping of mines.49
The Commission Report began with the premise that "[i]t is of vital
importance to Swedish security policy that Swedish territory be pro-
tected by all available means against violations. . . . Confidence in our
determination and ability to remain neutral must be maintained."50 To
serve these goals, the Commission concluded, the Swedish defenders at
Harsfjarden had legitimately resorted to the use of force. Moreover, the
Commission took the view that the response to future intrusions should
be even more forceful, to insure that the countermeasures are
successful. 51
This recommendation followed from the Commission's finding that
the Swedish forces had shown too much restraint in the HarsfJarden epi-
sode, using too few depth charges, for example, to be effective: "It can-
not be excluded that some opportunities for effective action . . . could
not be fully exploited because of too restrictive firing instructions. '52
The Commission Report did not ignore the hazards of more fully "effec-
tive" measures, acknowledging that depth charges "are inevitably blunt
anti-submarine weapons, with which it is difficult to distinguish between
effective fire for the purpose of forcing the submarine to the surface and
fire intended to sink the submarine. ' 53 Moreover:
The step from individual depth charges to multiple drops (on two occasions
patterns of four were dropped), like the decision to use mines, was taken in
the clear awareness that increased use of fire aimed at forcing submarines to
the surface also involved an increasing risk of their being sunk. 54
Nevertheless, these concerns were overridden, in the Commission's judg-
ment, by military necessity. Thus, the Report concluded that "multiple
drops [of depth charges] . . . must generally be tolerated even knowing
the risk of an unintentional sinking-if the depth charge, as a weapon, is
to have any real effect."'55
In addition to the depth charges, five mines were detonated during the
49. Id. at 74.
50. Minutes of the Swedish Government, Oct. 21, 1982, quoted in COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 1, at 7-8.
51. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 81-87.
52. Id. at 51.
53. Id. at 52.
54. Id. at 43.
55. Id. at 52.
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Harsfjarden operation. The Commission Report acknowledged that it
was highly questionable whether it is possible to detonate mines in such a
way as to cause controllable, limited damage that will force a submarine
to the surface rather than sink it.56 According to the Commission Re-
port, the decision of the Commander-in-Chief to use mines in a situation
in which the danger of a breakout was judged imminent "was made in
the awareness of the risk of doing damage on a scale that could not
wholly be foreseen. The Supreme Commander informed the Govern-
ment to this effect."'57
Nevertheless, the Commission Report insisted that the purpose of the
use of mines was to force the submarines to the surface and that, conse-
quently, the personnel in charge of detonations "deliberately refrained
from automatically detonating mines, and attempted instead a flexible,
more sophisticated technique of delayed detonation after indication. '58
Despite the unsuccessful HarsfJarden experience, the Commission Re-
port recommended the use of mine barrages in the future to combat alien
submarines. 59
IV. Conflicting Conceptions of Lawfulness
The legal arguments of Sweden and the Soviet Union centered around
three main issues: (1) the violation of territorial sovereignty; (2) the ju-
risdictional immunity of alien submarines; and (3) the use of force by a
coastal state to protect its interests.
A. Violation of Swedish Territory
The Swedish government viewed the submarine incidents as infringe-
ments of Sweden's exclusive right to control access of aliens to the en-
tirety of its territory, including its territorial waters. In the first Swedish
statement regarding Karlskrona, the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs
described the incursion of the Soviet submarine into the restricted mili-
tary area as a "violation of Swedish territory" and termed its entry into
Swedish internal waters without permission from the Swedish authorities
a "gross violation of entry regulations" which the Swedish government
viewed "very seriously." 6 The intrusion was a "deliberate violation of
56. Id.
57. Id. at 53.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. RSDS, Oct. 28, 1981; FBIS, supra note 4, at 2 (interview with 0. Ullsten). It should be
noted that Article 4 of the Swedish Proclamation Concerning the Admission to Swedish Terri-
tory of Foreign Naval Vessels and Military Aircraft (1966: 366) provides that craft in distress
can enter Swedish territory without authorization or notification. However, the Soviet subma-
Yale Journal of International Law
Swedish territory for illegal intelligence aims" made "all the more unac-
ceptable as the submarine was in all likelihood equipped with nuclear
charges." 61
The Swedish government asserted, therefore, that the territorial viola-
tion was aggravated by the high security risk resulting from the presence
of the vessel within the restricted military area, the performance of intel-
ligence tasks, and the carrying of nuclear weapons.
The response of the Soviet Union focused on the alleged inadvertance
of the intrusion, and did not mention the contravention of Swedish regu-
lations, the entry into a restricted area, or the presence of nuclear arms. 62
According to the Soviet government, the submarine had no hostile inten-
tions, and thus its presence within Swedish waters "in no way affected
Sweden's security interests. ' 63 Therefore, "the Soviet Government reso-
lutely rejected the protest contained in the Swedish Government's state-
ment as devoid of any legal or factual basis."64
By limiting its legal arguments to the absence of hostile intent and the
absence of any security risk, the Soviet government avoided engaging in a
debate that might undermine principles recognized by its own law, which
defend the right of a coastal state to regulate access to its territory. So-
viet law does not provide for the general right of innocent passage of
alien warships, and requires all foreign vessels passing through its territo-
rial waters to apply thirty days in advance through diplomatic channels
for an entry permit, and to comply with its strict regulations. 65 Subma-
rines allowed to enter Soviet territorial and internal waters must navigate
on the surface.66 Infringement of either provision by an alien submarine
is considered a violation of Soviet sovereignty, and the Soviet Ministry of
Defense has issued instructions that a foreign submarine discovered
within the state boundaries of the U.S.S.R. while submerged is to be
destroyed. 67
rine was not considered by the Swedish authorities as belonging to this category. See
Theutenberg, supra note 2, at 101.
61. AFP, Nov. 5, 1981.
62. 33 CURRNr DIG. SOVIET Parss, No. 45, at 5 (1981).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Articles 16 and 17 of the 1960 Statute on the State Boundary and the 1960 Rules for
Visits of Foreign Warships to Territorial Waters and Ports of the U.S.S.R., quoted in W. BUT-
LER, THE SovIET UNION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 52-54, 64 (1971).
66. Id.
67. BARBOLIA, VOENNO-MORSKOI SPRAVOCHNIK 55, quoted in W. BUTLER, supra note
65, at 65.
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B. Jurisdictional Immunity of the Alien Submarine
Immediately following the events at Karlskrona, the Swedish govern-
ment instituted an investigation and made the return of the submarine
contingent upon its results. It is uncertain whether Sweden ever contem-
plated the possibility of not returning the vessel or of prosecuting its
commander or crew, but there were indications that in this particular
case the Swedes were inclined to take stronger action than was usual in
such situations.6 8
International law traditionally has afforded the coastal state very little
protection in a situation like Karlskrona. Under established practice, if
an alien warship does not observe the laws of a coastal state, that state
cannot prosecute the offender, but may only complain to the government
of the country to which the vessel belongs.69 The implication of this rule
is that the offense may be punished only by the flag state. The Swedish
authorities believed that the submarine found at Karlskrona was proba-
bly carrying out a mission ordered by its superiors and directed against
Sweden's military installations. Thus, it was their view that a Swedish
investigation into the causes of the incident was the only reliable way of
protecting Swedish interests.70
Anxious to provide a legal justification for its actions, the Swedish
Government adopted an interpretation of the law of sovereign immunity
that conditioned the immunity of foreign warships within the waters of a
coastal state upon compliance with the coastal state's admission regula-
tions. The Legal Adviser of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated that
Sweden recognizes the principle of state immunity granting foreign state-
owned ships immunity from Swedish jurisdiction; however, that immu-
nity is conditioned upon permission to enter the territory.71 A vessel that
disregards admission regulations and flagrantly violates the law of a
country cannot be granted immunity in accordance with international
law, and the violated state has a right to investigate that vessel's activites
in its territory.72
According to this view, the traditional hierarchy of principles of the
law of the sea, which gives preference to the inclusive interests of the
68. See eg., RSIS, Oct. 29, 1981 (interview with T. Faildin).
69. See, eg., Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as 1958 Convention],
§ III(c), Art. 23 ("If any warship does not comply with the regulations of the coastal state
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance
which is made to it, the coastal state may require the warship to leave the territorial sea").
70. RSDS, Oct. 29, 1981; Theutenberg, supra note 2, at 102-03.
71. Theutenberg, supra note 2, at 88.
72. Id.
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international community over exclusive interests of particular partici-
pants, is reversed. The justified claim for protection against the possible
abuse of the freedom given to alien warships becomes the overriding pol-
icy consideration, allowing a coastal state to take actions traditionally
prohibited out of concern for freedom of passage.
Understandably enough, the Soviet Union, deviating from its own
law, 73 declared itself unequivocally in support of the customary interna-
tional rules. After asserting its adherence to the principle of absolute
jurisdictional immunity for warships, the Soviet Union defined its acqui-
escence in the Swedish investigation as "a certain exception" to the gen-
eral rule dictated by a "spirit of good will" and "the nature of Soviet-
Swedish relations." 74
C. The Use of Force
During the Karlskrona episode, the problem of the use of force against
the vessel and its commander and crew was not fully discussed by the
representatives of the Swedish political elite. The Swedish government
did not make any clear declarations as to its intentions. For example, at
the press conference during the second day of the affair, Prime Minister
Falldin said: "We are prepared to use the naval units we have and other
units as well to uphold our territory, but there is no reason to start talk-
ing about the use of force now."' 75 It is reasonable to assume that Sweden
did not contemplate any forcible action because there was no real neces-
sity for a resort to force: Sweden could control the situation sufficiently
by holding the submarine and its crew hostage. By maintaining some
uncertainty as to its intentions, however, Sweden attempted to exert pres-
sure on the Soviet Union and to strengthen its bargaining position in the
negotiations.76
Increasing submarine violations in 1982 and unsuccessful attempts to
capture the perpetrators through peaceful methods changed Sweden's at-
titude towards the use of force. Prime Minister Falldin and the Minister
of Foreign Affairs stated that the Navy's task was to force the alien ves-
sels to the surface in order to identify their nationality, board them, and
take them into port for interrogation of the crew. 77 To achieve this goal,
73. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
74. 33 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, No. 45, at 7 (1981).
75. RSDS, Oct. 29, 1981.
76. Reportedly, the Minister of Defense was not cautious enough and stated that force
would not be considered. This assurance was thought to explain the hardening of the Soviet
attitude towards the end of the negotiations. The Times, Nov. 5, 1981.
77. RSDS, Oct. 5, 1982; FBIS (W. Europe), Oct. 6, 1982, at 3-4; AFP, Oct. 6, 1982 (Inter-
view with T. Faildin).
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the Swedish government was ready to resort to armed force. The Com-
mander-in-Chief, commenting on the detonations of mines, said, "it was
carried out with the clear intention of seriously damaging a subma-
rine. . . . Exploding the mines in the way we did should reasonably have
caused a great deal of damage to a submarine. 78 He also confirmed that
the Armed Forces were prepared to repeat the same action in the future,
even if the possibility that the crew might die could not be excluded:
"There must always be a risk in intruding into Swedish waters," the
Commander-in-Chief concluded. 79
The strongest warning and clearest statement of the new policy came
from Swedish Prime Minister Palme, who returned to power after six
years in opposition on the day of the Harsfjarden mine detonation. At
the press conference during which the appointment of the Submarine De-
fense Commission was announced, the new Prime Minister said:
The Swedish Government has the option of ordering the military to sink
a foreign submarine in Swedish waters. Whoever is considering a violation
of Swedish territory must take into account that the Government will in
future use this option .... There are greater possibilities to sink a subma-
rine than to expel it or to force it to surface.80
Sweden's threat to sink foreign submarines in peacetime seemed to
have no effect on Soviet-Swedish relations. The Soviet Union did not
break international silence on this subject, and appeared to join other
members of the international community in implicit tolerance of the
Swedish policy. This tolerance may be construed as acquiescence in the
self-defense argument underlying the new Swedish policy, formulated
most explicitly by the Commission Report, which based its appraisal of
the lawfulness of the Harsfjarden operation on Chapter 10, Article 9 of
the Swedish Instrument of Government, establishing the Government's
responsibility for defending the territory against violations by foreign
powers: "The Government may authorize the defense forces to use force
in accordance with international law and custom for the purpose of
preventing any violation of the territory of the Realm in times of peace,
or during a war between foreign states."81 The Commission Report based
this assertion on the right of self-defense embodied in Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, which entitles every state, in the words of the
Commission, to defend its sovereignty and its territory, if necessary by
78. RSIS, Oct. 13, 1982; FBIS (W. Europe), Oct. 14, 1982, at 2.
79. Id.
80. RSDS, Oct. 22, 1982; FBIS (W. Europe), Oct. 25, 1982, at 1-2 (Press conference).
81. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 78.
Yale Journal of International Law
recourse "to arms."' 82 Consequently, the Commission concluded, "meas-
ures taken in accordance with the right of self-defense cannot be re-
garded as aggression."83
V. Outcome
On July 17, 1982, the Swedish Government published an "Ordinance
Containing Instructions for the Armed Forces in Times of Peace and in
State of Neutrality,"'84 which replaced General Order 48/1967 and en-
tered into force on July 1, 1983.85
The evolution of the Swedish law reflects the changes in behavior
caused by the frequency and gravity of submarine violations. The 1967
General Order had stated that the purpose of any action taken by the
Armed Forces against an intruding alien submarine was to turn it away
from Swedish territory to the high seas. Section 15 of the Ordinance
read as follows:
A foreign submarine which is found submerged within Swedish internal
waters shall be forced to surface. It shall then be ordered to stop, be identi-
fied, and then taken to an anchorage for further action. If necessary, force
of arms may be used. A foreign submarine which is found submerged
within the territorial sea shall be turned away from the territory. If neces-
sary, force of arms may be used. Should special circumstances so require,
the Supreme Commander may order recourse to force of arms without
prior warning against a foreign submarine which is found submerged within
Swedish waters.86
The consistent increase in the number of submarine intrusions coupled
with the more openly provocative behavior of the intruding submarines,
their more frequent operation within Swedish internal waters and re-
stricted military areas, and their refusal to allow themselves to be turned
away, induced the Submarine Defense Commission to recommend fur-
ther tightening of the 1982 Ordinance.87 Its proposals were adopted by
the government on March 3, 1983.88 Section 15 now reads as follows:
82. Id.
83. Id. The self-defense argument in favor of a forceful action against a "spying" warship
also was advanced by some writers. See, eg., Delupis, Foreign Warships and Immunity for
Espionage, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 72-75 (1984).
84. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 79.
85. The long period between the adoption and entry into force of the act was due to the
need for comprehensive amendment of the detailed regulations promulgated by the Com-
mander-in-Chief under the previous General Order. The delay also permitted translation and
appropriate publication of the new rules abroad. Id. at 79.
86. Id. at 79-80.
87. Id. at 81-82.
88. Id. at 82.
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A foreign submarine which is found submerged within Swedish internal
waters shall be forced to surface. It shall then be ordered to stop, be identi-
fied and be taken to an anchorage for further action. If necessary, force of
arms shall be used without prior warning. A foreign submarine which is
found submerged within the territorial sea shall be turned away from the
territory. If necessary, force of arms shall be used. Should special circum-
stances so require, the force of arms may be used without prior warning
pursuant to a decision by the Supreme Commander. 89
Thus, the new law authorizes the use of force without warning as a
rule rather than as an exception. In explaining the motives for this
change, the Commission stated its view that it is impossible for an alien
submarine to navigate into Swedish internal waters by'mistake. Accord-
ing to the Commission, Sweden's twelve-mile territorial sea insures that:
if an alien submarine is found in Swedish internal waters, it can be stated
with confidence, that both its commander and those who gave the order for
its mission are well aware of the submarine's forbidden position and pur-
pose. No warning is required to inform the parties concerned. The same
circumstance emphasizes also the extreme improbability of a submarine
crew allowing itself to be forced to the surface merely by warning shots.90
The Commission's opinion was that, in practice, the warnings merely
facilitated evasive maneuvers. 91
The lesson gained from the operational experience at Harsfjarden was
that, in order to be effective, these new rules had to be matched by im-
proved methods of anti-submarine defense. Since 1958, the Navy's share
of military spending had decreased from 18% to 13%, despite the clear
shift in emphasis toward naval units elsewhere.92 After the Karlskrona
event, the Swedish media and the Armed Forces demanded more effec-
tive defense against violations of Swedish territory. The special review of
anti-submarine defense resources resulted in a 200 million kroner pack-
age, which formed part of the 1982 Defense Act and was meant to im-
prove surveillance, location, and weaponry employed in anti-submarine
actions.93 Although the main emphasis was on new surveillance and lo-
cation programs, the new weaponry developed and acquired by the
Swedish Navy is the most important aspect of this defense program from
the standpoint of international law.
The two most significant weaponry developments were incident depth
charges (ELMAs) and anti-submarine torpedos. ELMAs, which are
89. Id.
90. Id. at 84.
91. Id.
92. RSIS, Feb. 3, 1982.
93. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 90.
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used primarily by patrol boats and missile boat units, are designed to
create numerous scattered punctures in a submarine's hull that are not
big enough to sink the submarine immediately, but that make immediate
repair impossible, so that the submarine is forced to the surface without
harming the crew. 94 The chance of preserving human life in these cir-
cumstances, of course, depends upon the capacity of the vessel to surface
as quickly as possible. The new anti-submarine torpedo, which is in-
tended for use by helicopters, missile boats, and submarines, has an ex-
plosive head designed to destroy the submarine's screw, thereby
impairing its maneuvering capacity. 95
In addition, the Swedes installed a new permanent underwater surveil-
lance system for certain key areas, which is supplemented by a controlled
mine system. The number of mines is being increased and they are being
modernized. 96
The development of a surveillance system and the "incident weapons"
shows how the events at Karlskrona and Harsfjarden, particularly the
latter, influenced Swedish concepts of anti-submarine defense. Before
these events, Sweden was not prepared, either in terms of resources or in
policy and strategy terms, to deal with submarine violations. The events
of 1981-82 brought about a new policy of forcing submarines to surface,
when possible, without causing loss of life. At that time, however, the
resources needed to implement that policy were not available. To put it
bluntly, even if a submarine could have been located precisely, the Swed-
ish Navy had only two choices: to sink and destroy the vessel with its
crew, or to let it go. The high probability of casualties, on the one hand,
coupled with the need to demonstrate Sweden's determination to stop the
intrusions, on the other, explains in part the confusion and hesitancy of
the command and control systems which sought to cope with the subma-
rine intrusions. Sweden's development of the "incident weapons" appar-
ently resolved this dilemma. From the Swedish point of view, these
weapons represent a rational, balanced response to both the security risk
caused by the violations and the difficulty of preventing them, and a way
of maintaining the credibility of their policy of neutrality. From the
standpoint of international ocean-users, however, they constitute an un-
precedented threat to underwater peacetime navigation in foreign waters.
94. RSIS, Feb. 3, 1982; see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 83.
95. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 83.
96. Id. at 93; Svenska Dagbladet, Nov. 28, 1981.
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VI. International Appraisal
The submarine incident provoked the strongest reaction in the Scandi-
navian countries. During the events at Karlskrona, the ministers of for-
eign affairs of Denmark and Norway held a joint press conference, on
November 6, 1981, in which they condemned the violation of Swedish
territory by the Soviet submarine, and particularly the presence of nu-
clear weapons on board.97 The Norwegian minister warned that if a sim-
ilar violation occurred in Norwegian waters, the authorities would use
depth charges. 98 The governments of Norway, Denmark, and Iceland
ordered their ambassadors to the U.S.S.R. to boycott the annual celebra-
tion of the October Revolution as a protest against the presence of nu-
clear torpedos on board the submarine. 99 Only the Finnish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs failed to express protest, limiting itself to a remark that
the submarine affair was regrettable, but that it concerned solely Sweden
and the Soviet Union. 100
The governments of the other Western countries did not speak out.
The silence of the major powers can probably be explained by the diffi-
cult configuration of interests at stake. On the one hand, a flagrant viola-
tion of the territorial sovereignty of Sweden called for condemnation of
the Soviet intrusion in Karlskrona. On the other hand, Sweden's deter-
mination to stop such incidents, even at the cost of infringing upon the
principles of the law of the sea, gave rise to some apprehension. For
some naval powers, the affair was a reminder that they could easily find
themselves in the Soviets' predicament.10 '
The People's Republic of China was not so reticent, and seized upon
the occasion of the Karlskrona affair to accuse the Soviet Union of du-
plicity in supporting Western European nuclear disarmament move-
ments while intruding into Swedish territory with a nuclear-armed
submarine.102
The Karlskrona event was brought to the attention of the participants
in the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The
chief Swedish delegate stated that the Soviet Union had violated the Hel-
sinki Act of 1975. The Soviet delegation responded to this accusation by
repeating the official version of the incident, and the matter was not dis-
97. Berlinske Tidende, Nov. 7, 1981.
98. Id.
99. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1981, at 3, col. 4.
100. RSDS, Nov. 6, 1981.
101. It is presumably out of such considerations that during the Pueblo incident the Soviet
Union refrained from publicizing the affair and commenting on its legal implications. See But-
ler, The Pueblo Crisis: Some Legal Reflections, 63 PROc. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 7-8 (1969).
102. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1981, at A5, col. 1.
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cussed further. 10 3
During the search for submarines in Harsfjarden, the Swedish Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, speaking in the United Nations General Assembly,
said that "Swedish territory will be protected from violations with all
available means." 1 4 Emphasizing the Swedish policy of neutrality, L.
Bodstrom added that "such violations will be treated with equal determi-
nation no matter where they emanate from." 105 As with Karlskrona, the
international community neither questioned nor condemned the Swedish
actions. The international media reported both events in a manner gen-
erally sympathetic to the Swedish government's actions.
VII. Writer's Appraisal
Swedish policy was approved of by some states (Norway and Den-
mark) and tolerated by other members of the international community,
many of whom face similar problems as coastal states (for instance, Ar-
gentina, Italy, and Japan). Norway adopted rules permitting the use of
force against intruding alien submarines.10 6 No member of the interna-
tional community protested the new Swedish poicy.10 7 Taking into ac-
count the great publicity given to the incident and the careful mutual
monitoring by international actors, this silence can only be interpreted as
acquiescence.
The acceptance of Swedish actions by the world community, notwith-
standing their apparent incongruence with well-established international
practice, is only partly explained by the special circumstances in which
Sweden found itself. It must also be assumed that international elites
were aware that, by tacitly approving of the Swedish behavior, they were
acquiescing not only in a justified case of self-defense, but also in the
erosion of a long-standing principle of international law.
The international norm of jurisdictional immunity for foreign war-
ships, itself unequivocal under customary international law, must be con-
sidered in the context of rules pertaining to the control of coastal states
over access to their territory, an area in which international law is equiv-
ocal and which has undergone a number of recent changes. These
changes seem aimed at enhancing protection of the security interests of
103. RSDS, Nov. 10, 1981; FBIS (W. Europe), Nov. 12, 1981, at 4.
104. N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1982, at A2, col. 6.
105. Id.
106. PRESS & INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, ROYAL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, FOREIGN
SUBMARINES IN NORWEGIAN WATERS 1, 8 (Fact Sheet No. 0383, May 1983).
107. The U.S.S.R. did break off ministerial-level relations after publication of the Commis-
sion's Report; however these relations are clearly on the mend. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 31,
1984, at A2, col. 3.
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coastal states at the expense of the competence of other users of the
oceans. A brief examination of this context may be useful in explaining
the international reaction to the new Swedish policy.
The centuries-old principle of freedom of navigation is animated by a
conviction that only "a minimum of monopolization of either use or au-
thority" over the oceans "can create the greatest net gains both in the
.. .value of general security and the. . . values of wealth, enlighten-
ment, well-being and so on." 108 This principle implies a right of passage
of alien ships through the territorial sea of a coastal state. However,
there has been, and to a certain extent still is, doubt as to whether the
principle of freedom of navigation should imply the right of passage in
peacetime of foreign warships. Some states share an opinion, expressed
most eloquently by Professor Hall, that the passage of warships has dif-
ferent functions than transit of merchant ships, and constitutes an immi-
nent threat to the security of the coastal state. Hence, the coastal state
has the right to regulate the passage of warships by requiring that the
foreign warship obtain an authorization or at least notify the coastal state
of its intention to pass. 10 9
Many states, however, contend that the right of passage in peacetime
has been recognized from time immemorial as one of the fundamental
principles of the law of the sea. Oppenheim states:
in practice no State actually opposes in time of peace the passage of foreign
men-of-war and other public vessels through its maritime belt. It may
safely be stated, first, that a usage has grown up by which such passage, if in
every way inoffensive and without danger, shall not be denied in time of
peace; and, secondly, that it is now a customary rule of International Law
that the right of passage through such parts of the maritime belt as form
108. M. McDoUGAL & J. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 562 (1962).
109. Professor Hall states that:
The right of innocent passage does not extend to vessels of war. Its possession by them
could not be explained upon the ground by which commercial passage is justified. The
interests of the whole world are concerned in the possession of the utmost liberty of navi-
gation for the purpose of trade by the vessels of all states. But no general interests are
necessary or commonly involved in the possession by a state of a right to navigate the
waters of other states with its ships of war. Such a privilege is to the advantage only of
the individual state; it may often be injurious to third states; and it may sometimes be
dangerous to the proprietor of the waters used. A state has therefore always the right to
refuse access to its territorial waters to the armed vessels of other states, if it wishes to do
SO.
W. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 198 (P. Higgins 8th ed. 1924). The same argument was
made by Elihu Root on behalf of the United States in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case:
"Warships may not pass and repass.. . because they threaten. Merchant ships may pass and
repass because they do not threaten." 11 Proceedings in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries
Arbitration 2007 (1912). See P. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARIME
JURISDICTION 120 (1927); G. GIDEL, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 284 (1934); Soviet
writers quoted by W. BUTLER, supra note 65, at 59 et seq.
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part of the highways for international traffic cannot be denied to foreign
men-of-war. 110
The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
(1958 Convention) provides for the right of innocent passage of all ships
through the territorial sea,111 but some states advocated a denial of this
right to warships and made reservations accordingly.1 12 Although the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Conven-
tion) followed the path set by the 1958 Convention in granting the right
of innocent passage to all ships, 113 the controversy concerning warships
was not extinguished and the uncertainty as to the existence of a general
consensus among states concerning the matter was not dispelled. 114 The
frequent practice is that a coastal state regularly accords passage to for-
eign warships, but reserves the right to regulate and even to forbid such
passage.1 15 In this situation, the question of whether the passage of for-
eign warships through territorial waters other than straits1 6 is a matter
of right accorded the flag state, or a matter of tolerance by the coastal
state, remains open.
Once a foreign warship is within territorial waters, it enjoys full immu-
110. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 494 (Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955); cf. C.
COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 237 (5th ed. 1962); 1 E. BRUEL, INTER-
NATIONAL STRArrs 230 (1947) (although the right of innocent passage of warships cannot be
assumed to exist, such a right is accorded to them in practice by all states in time of peace); 1
D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 274-76 (1982); Froman, Uncharted Wa-
ters: Non-innocent Passage of Warships in the Territorial Sea, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 630-46
(1984).
111. 1958 Convention, supra note 69, § III, art. 14(1).
112. M. McDOUGAL & J. BURKE, supra note 108, at 218-20. Sweden is not a party to the
1958 Convention.
113. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 [hereinafter cited as LOS Convention], art. 17. Sweden is a
signatory to the LOS Convention.
114. Froman, supra note 110, at 639-42 (summary of debates at the Third U.N. Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea).
115. For the history of state practice, see generally D. O'CONNELL, supra note 110, at 277-
81. Approximately 50 states support the right of the coastal state to require notification or
authorization. Froman, supra note 110, at 651-54.
116. The International Court of Justice held in the Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom
v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, that a coastal state may not prohibit innocent passage of warships
through its straits in time of peace. Id. at 29. See M. MCDOUGAL & J. BURKE, supra note
108, at 54-69, 202. In Judge Azevedo's dissent in Corfu Channel, however, after having quoted
the authorities denying a right of passage to warships, he stated: "To sum up, it is evident that
all the arguments invoked in favour of freedom of passage for warships are clouded in confu-
sion, at any rate sufficiently to bar the recognition of a custom in accordance with traditional
requirements." 1949 I.C.J. at 101. (Azevedo, J., dissenting). See also G. GIDEL, supra note
109, at 283-84. The confusion concerning the regime of straits was not totally dispelled by the
LOS Convention. See Reisman, The Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal of
International Law Making, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 48 (1980); Moore, The Regime of Straits and
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1980).
Foreign Submarines in Swedish Waters
nity from the jurisdiction of any state except its flag state. 117 This princi-
ple, being a direct offshoot of the doctrine of the sovereign immunity of
states, has an exceptionally strong grounding in customary international
law. It guarantees that a foreign warship cannot be seized, that no offi-
cial of the coastal state can board the vessel without the permission of the
commander of the ship, and that no judicial proceedings can be brought
against the officers and crew. 118 The only protection customary interna-
tional law gives a coastal state against possible abuses of the immunity
privilege is the requirement that the vessel comply with the coastal state's
regulations concerning the admission of foreign warships to its waters.119
If, however, the warship fails to observe these regulations, the coastal
state's response is limited to a complaint lodged with the flag state. 20 If
the violation persists, the coastal state can only require the vessel to leave
its waters. 121 This norm was confirmed by both the 1958 Convention 122
and the LOS Convention. 123 Unlike the rules regarding right of passage,
which distinguish between territorial and internal waters, leaving to the
coastal state the exclusive competence to regulate access to its internal
waters, the rules concerning jurisdictional immunity apply indiscrimi-
nately, notwithstanding the location of the warship. 24
The policy with respect to the rights of foreign warships first crystal-
lized at a time when a few naval powers were the only effective deci-
sionmakers in the international community. While serving an important
inclusive interest, this policy nevertheless primarily benefited those major
naval powers that had the means to enjoy such freedom through deploy-
ment of their warships throughout the world, to the detriment of the
interests of coastal states. From the perspective of the coastal states,
warships are a weapon of power politics-symbols and instruments of
coercive action that pose a threat to their security. The fear of this threat
has stimulated some of these states to react violently in the past.125
The development of electronic intelligence gathering and surveillance,
117. C. COLOMBOS, supra note 110, at 241. Colombos notes, however, that the original
entry of the foreign warship must have been expressly or impliedly permitted by the coastal
state. Id.
118. Id. at 241-42.
119. Id. at 242.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 1958 Convention, supra note 69, § III art. 23.
123. LOS Convention, supra note 113, art. 30.
124. This conclusion seems to be consistent with the lack of such a distinction in custom-
ary international law and the scholarly writings.
125. Some examples are the 1946 incident in the Corfu Channel (Albania and the United
Kingdom), the 1964 incident in the Gulf of Tonkin (the United States and North Korea), and
the 1967 U.S.S. Liberty incident (the United States and Israel).
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which in peacetime operate, inter alia, from warships, made the problem
more acute. For the coastal states, which often do not have adequate
means to counter this sort of activity, intelligence operations within their
waters can be seen as violations of their rights and a serious risk to their
security. 126 On the other hand, almost all states are involved in some
form of intelligence-gathering, which is deemed indispensable to rational
decisionmaking and deterrence.1 27
Claims to enhanced protection of the rights of coastal states induced
certain restrictions on the right of passage. In the 1958 Convention,
coastal states claimed competence to decide whether a passage of a for-
eign ship through their territorial waters was innocent-that is, "not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state" 128-
and to prevent passage which was not innocent.1 29
The general, abstract terms in which these provisions were worded
gave the coastal state wide discretion to interpret and apply them in a
way which might be detrimental to the inclusive interests of the interna-
tional community. Hence, there was widespread opinion that a prescrip-
tion on innocent passage should be formulated "with maximum precision
and certainty of reference." 1 30 The LOS Convention attempted to re-
strain the discretion of coastal states by providing an exhaustive list of
criteria for evaluating whether-a passage is prejudicial to the peace, good
order, and security of the coastal state.131
Although this provision limits, the discreiin of the coastal states, its
scope is wide enough to permit them to regulate navigation in their terri-
torial seas. A tendency to enhance ih protection of their interests may
be discerned, particularly in the 'regulafion 6fthe passage of submarines.
126. At least one writer considers the gathering of secret information by a warship in the
internal waters of a foreign state to be an act contrary to international law. See Delupis, supra
note 83, at 69. Cf Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice:
General Principles and Substantive Law, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 29 (1950) (commenting on the
Corfu Channel decision: "It is an inference from certain of the Court's observations. . . that if
the motive were espionage, e.g., the observation of the coastal defenses, the passage would not
rank as innocent").
127. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The Intelligence Function and World Public Order,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPO-
RARY PERSPECTIVE 311 (M. McDougal & W. Reisman eds. 1981) ("the gathering of intelli-
gence within the territorial confines of another state is not, in and of itself, contrary to
international law unless it contravenes policies of the world constitutive process according
support to protected features of internal public order"). But cf id. at 310 n.53.
128. 1958 Convention, supra note 69, art. 14(4).
129. Id. art. 16.
130. Burke, Contemporary Law of the Seaw Transportation, Communication and Flight, 2
YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORDER 210 (1976).
131. LOS Convention, supra note 113, art. 19(2).
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Both the 1958 Convention13 2 and the LOS Convention 133 require subma-
rines passing through territorial waters to navigate on the surface and to
show their flag. In other words, submerged passage is considered preju-
dicial to the interests of coastal states, which are under-standably appre-
hensive about "the use of their territory, without their notice or
knowledge, by foreign military craft of great strategic and tactical impor-
tance." 134 On the other hand, requiring surface passage of submarines
may be prejudicial to the security interests of those states employing
them, and may aggravate international tensions. 135 For this reason some
states have strongly opposed a requirement of surface passage for
submarines.
The assumption underlying the requirement of surface passage - that
submergence in territorial waters' of a foreign state is tantamount to an
exercise of non-innocent passage - is overinclusive, since submerged
submarines might be engaged in an innocent passage (that is, one not
prejudicial to the peace, good order, and security of the coastal state).
Whether a submerged passage is a non-innocent passage must always be
a matter of cautious evaluation by the competent authorities of the
coastal state: afortiori, the submerged passage does not give the coastal
state a license to use arms against the alleged perpetrator. 136
The development of rules concerning innocent passage has been ac-
companied by a gradual extension of the width of internal and territorial
waters, thus submitting ever larger portions of the oceans to the exclusive
authority of coastal states. It seems, therefore, that in the past few de-
cades the general trend has been towards enhancing protection of the
interests of coastal states and, in particular, their claim to security and
wealth, even if there are reasonable doubts as to how widely the consen-
sus on some issues is shared. The Swedish policy with respect to subma-
rine violations and the international tolerance of that policy are the most
dramatic chapter in this development.
For many centuries, the unimpeded access of foreign warships to terri-
torial waters in peacetime was considered essential to the maintenance of
friendly relations among members of the international community and to
the improvement of its security through the limitation of tension and
conflicts. It is true that unhindered passage of navies through parts of
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133. LOS Convention, supra note 113, art. 20.
134. Burke, supra note 130, at 213.
135. Reisman, supra note 116, at 48-57; D. O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON
SEA POWER 106-07 (1975); Osgood, US. Security Interests in Ocean Law, 1 OcEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 3. 2 (1974).
136. Cf. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 110, at 294-97.
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territorial waters forming straits and other international waterways is of
paramount importance to public order, while more extensive restrictions
on passage through other parts of the territorial sea, and particularly
through internal waters (where coastal states assert an undisputed exclu-
sive competence), are considered justified because international naviga-
tion is less likely to be disrupted and important interests of coastal states
are involved. If, however, the perceived need for protection leads a
coastal state to the general denial of submerged passage in its territorial
sea and disregard for the immunity of alien warships found in its internal
waters, the likely result will be a destabilizing effect on the security of the
international community. This result is particularly likely when the
coastal state views itself as justified in using force against such foreign
warships. Use of force, even in self-defense, invites use of force.
The Soviet intrusions into Swedish waters clearly demonstrate how the
abuse of privileges given by international law leads to the erosion of es-
tablished norms. While the Swedish response to these incidents may have
been reasonable from the Swedish viewpoint, and while it received the
acquiescence of the international community, a norm permitting the use
of force to repel unauthorized passages of foreign warships in peacetime
must be viewed with concern. International law, if it is to mean more
than merely naked power, must be based on l'esprit communautaire -
the common awareness that prudence, self-restraint, and reciprocity are
in the long run the best means for maximizing and sharing values in the
world community.
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